

Israeli Army Strategy

2015-2020

Abstract and Table of Contents

1. Abstract

The **Israeli Army Strategy** document, published by the Chief of Staff's office in August 2015, reviews the changes required in the establishment. It considers the future challenges and shifts in the shape of the enemy, such as the consolidation and improvement of the land manoeuvre effect; the diversification of the capabilities for operations classified lower than wars; enhancing the electronic dimension; and maintaining an obvious intelligence, air and marine superiority. In addition, the doctrine organizes the Leadership and Control theory during war, so that an efficient action may be carried out by these capabilities in the battlefield.

The present book consists of three chapters. The first two introduce and analyze the plan, whereas the third presents an Arabic translation of the document from Hebrew.

According to Chapter One, this is the first time the Israeli Military publishes its Strategy, reflecting a shift in the relation between the civil and military institutions. While some information is kept undisclosed, the military establishment aims to achieve a breakthrough at the level of intentions towards some particular states. There is no mention of possible threats by states, but by organizations.

The Strategy refers to the major political and security changes faced by Israel. The Western support for its policies has weakened, while the groups' capabilities have developed to strike the heart of Israel and wage a long war. As a result, the security and military budgets are burdened.

Focus is laid on the Israeli Army's doctrine, traditions, main activities and priorities in light of the Israeli strategic context, as well as the means to protect the country from the rising danger of enemies at peace times before new rounds of war. A new approach is presented for battle confrontation, adopting immediate response based on 'provocations', striking thousands of planned and unplanned targets and enhancing the role of land troops. That would replace the enemy attrition Strategy employed by the Army in the previous wars of Lebanon and Gaza, showing continuous use of excessive force.

Furthermore, a new model is proposed for the distribution of tasks. The perspective of building power as well as the potential for manoeuvre and fire is

changed, in order to simultaneously combine manoeuvre, power of fire and special operations of online war. The end of Chapter One cites the commendation and criticism of the plan at different levels of the state.

According to Chapter Two, the Strategy reflects a feeling of uncertainty of existence, in addition to recognition of the rising power of the Palestinian resistance to threaten the survival of Israel. On the other hand, there are the challenges rising from the regional tensions, mainly if the Syrian regime collapses, in spite of all the previous propaganda of enmity.

As for the strategic and operation milieu, it seems that the identity of the opponent has shifted from 'Arab' to 'Islamic.' The challenge is that the confrontation now is expensive, while the adversary can make a balance of terror with a lesser cost. The shift would extend to other levels, especially psychological war and media.

Here, focus is laid on the network of intelligence, which is urged to keep the standards of victory at the tactical, rather than the impossible strategic, level. The document relates the use of force to the achievement of political and tactical objectives. The confrontation is divided into three levels, last of which is war. The Chief of Staff is entrusted with deciding the level on a case-by-case basis. New tactical visions are proposed to counter groups – mainly Hamas and Hezbollah – at each level.

According to the book, the Strategy maintains the Israeli deterrence conventions. Terror shall be consolidated in the mind of the opponent, by the use of 'legitimate' excessive force.

As for organization, fighting and the Battalion theory, there are components and roles for the General Command as a top command of the army. Furthermore, general responsibilities and authorities are granted to the Chief of Staff as the exclusive operation leader through the General Command and major commanders, constituting the only link with the government. Such responsibilities are also re-arranged between the different levels. However, the political role is left in the command and control part to the Chief of Staff.

The conclusion of the chapter highlights the building of power in the Strategy, in terms of issuing broad directives on relative quality superiority. Firstly, the development of the technological infrastructure is stressed. Secondly, priority is assigned to attack over defence capabilities. Thirdly, such capabilities shall always be promoted. Fourthly, fire shall be arranged from air, land and sea at the same time.

Chapter Three provides an Arabic translation of the **Israeli Army Strategy**, which represents the cornerstone in guiding the employment and building of the Israeli power. It is divided into 5 parts: Strategic Framework; Strategic and

Operation Milieu; Israeli Army's Use of Force; Field Battalion Theory and Israeli Army's Organization of Fighting; and Israeli Army's Building of Power.

Finally, the analysis argues that the document proves an Israeli arrogant mindset believing in absolute power, in spite of admitting the high cost of the Strategy. It may be considered a kind of awareness of the inability for expansion for demographic and geographical considerations, thus limiting the focus of superiority to the regional milieu.

2. Table of Contents

Title	Page
Introduction	7
Chapter One First Analysis of Israeli Army Strategy	13
Chapter Two First Analysis of Israeli Army Strategy	27
Chapter Three Israeli Army Strategy: The Text Translated from Hebrew	53
English Abstract	--